Systems and Equipment Malfunctions

At least three of the elements or sub-elements listed in K1 through K5 (AI.XII.C.S1). The Area XII note also makes this Task mandatory for ASEL and ASES (the evaluator must select at least Tasks B and C).

Those elements are:

• Causes of partial or complete power loss (K1)
• Electrical, vacuum/pressure and associated instrument, pitot-static, electronic flight deck display, landing gear or flap, and inoperative trim malfunctions (K2)
• Smoke or fire onboard (K3)
• Any other system specific to the aircraft, such as supplemental oxygen or deicing (K4)
• Inadvertent door or window opening (K5)

Practical consequence: you cannot prepare one malfunction well and hope. Know your airplane's systems cold, because the evaluator picks three.

Battery endurance scales inversely with load — the number that makes it urgent: a 25-amp-hour battery could produce 5 amps for 5 hours, but at a 10-amp load it might last only 2 hours, and a 40-amp load might discharge it fully in about 10 or 15 minutes (AFH 18-13). Most in-flight electrical failures are in the generator or alternator; once it goes offline, the only source is the battery. Age and internal resistance make it worse, and time already spent before the failure was noticed comes off the top.

So the teaching sequence is (AFH 18-13):

1. Shed all but the most necessary equipment — immediately.
2. Notify ATC and request radar vectors to the nearest suitable airport. Any loss of electrical power is critical in a small airplane.
3. Plan the arrival early. Expect a no-flap landing and anticipate a manual gear extension if those systems are electric.

The trap worth naming: gear and flap motors use power at rates much greater than most other equipment — selecting them on a partially depleted battery may cause an immediate total loss of electrical power (AFH 18-13).

The failure signature is the teaching point, because it is gradual: as the gyros slow they wander and become more susceptible to deflection from the plane of rotation (PHAK 8-22), and they may fail progressively — the airplane can be level at 2,000 feet while the attitude indicator shows a left turn, and the pilot may misinterpret it if he or she fails to see the OFF or failed flags (IFH 11-7). Many small aircraft are not equipped with a warning system for vacuum failure, so the pilot should monitor the vacuum/pressure gauge (IFH 11-8).

Background: the vacuum or pressure system spins the attitude and heading indicator gyros, usually off an engine-driven pump, and required suction is usually between 4.5 and 5.5 "Hg (PHAK 8-16). The turn coordinator is normally electric, which is the whole reason most aircraft have at least two sources of power so at least one source of bank information survives a single failure (PHAK 8-16).

The procedure you teach (IFH 11-7):

1. Maintain aircraft control while identifying the failed component — expedite the cross-check and include all flight instruments.
2. Compare the attitude indicator against the rate-of-turn indicator and the VSI. That one comparison tests the suction/pressure system against the static system against the electrical system, so it tells you which system died.
3. Attempt to restore — check the power source, change to a backup or alternate system, reset the instrument if possible.
4. Cover the failed instruments. It enhances the pilot's ability to maintain aircraft control by removing the wrong picture from the scan.
5. Advise ATC and, if necessary, declare an emergency before the situation deteriorates beyond the pilot's ability to recover.

The instructor's obligation: it is important that pilots practice instrument flight without reference to the attitude and heading indicators in preparation for such a failure (IFH 11-8). Partial panel is not an instrument-rating-only skill — it is the correction for this Task's element, and you teach it with a cover, not with a switch.

Because a partial static blockage may go unrecognized until a critical phase of flight: during takeoff, climb, and level-off the altimeter, ASI, and VSI may all appear normal, with no indication of malfunction until the airplane begins a descent (AFH 18-14).

Teach the descent signature. With a restricted (not fully blocked) static system in a descent, static pressure at the instruments lags behind actual outside pressure, so (AFH 18-14):

• The altimeter reads high.
• The VSI confirms the altimeter — it shows a lower descent rate than actual, which is why cross-checking those two does not catch it.
• The airspeed reads high — the instrument cannot tell more pitot pressure from less static reference.

The picture the pilot gets is "too high, too fast, descending slowly." In a subsequent climb the altitude still lags, the VSI under-reads the climb, and indicated airspeed may decrease alarmingly — the least pitch-up may put the needle dangerously near stall speed (AFH 18-14).

The confirmation: open the alternate static source while climbing or descending. If the needles move significantly, a static pressure problem exists and the alternate source should be used for the remainder of the flight (AFH 18-15).

Many light aircraft with glass displays share the same pitot-static inputs for the backup instrumentation — so that redundancy on the panel is not redundancy in the plumbing. Both systems receive the same input signals, so both could fail from an obstructed pitot tube or static port. Some manufacturers combine the air data computer and the AHRS, so a blockage of the input system may also affect the attitude display (AFH 18-15).

The second half is standardization. With conventional instruments the design and operation are similar across airplanes, and pilots diagnose failures by comparing information among the six instruments. Failure indications on electronic flight displays may be entirely different and are not standardized; primary and backup displays may respond differently to the same interruption of data, and both may behave unlike conventional instruments under the same conditions (AFH 18-15).

Instructor conclusion: you cannot teach EFIS failures generically. Obtain equipment-specific information for both the aircraft and the avionics and teach from that (AFH 18-16).

In light airplanes a no-flap approach and landing is not particularly difficult or dangerous, but four things change (AFH 18-10, 18-11):

• Landing distance increases — as much as 50 percent.
• The airplane must be flown relatively nose-high to maintain altitude in the pattern, and without flap drag it is harder to lose altitude. Fly a wider, longer pattern to avoid diving to lose altitude and building excessive airspeed.
• On final the nose-high attitude makes the runway hard to see and can create the perception of being near a stall — which may cause an abrupt nose-down input and a nosewheel-first touchdown.
• Without flaps the airplane is slightly less stable in pitch and roll and floats considerably in the roundout. Do not force it on at high speed; do not over-flare either, or the tail may strike.

The indication is a pronounced roll toward the wing with the least flap deflection when the flaps are moved (AFH 18-11).

Teach it as a cross-control problem: the roll is countered with opposite aileron, and the yaw from the extra drag of the extended flap requires substantial opposite rudder, resulting in a cross-controlled condition. Almost full aileron may be required to hold the wings level, especially at reduced approach speeds (AFH 18-11).

Three rules for the landing (AFH 18-11):

• Do not land with a crosswind from the side of the deployed flap — the roll authority needed to counter it may not be available.
• Fly the approach at a higher than normal airspeed.
• Do not flare excessively — an asymmetric stall here is loss of control. Fly it onto the runway at a speed with a safe margin above flaps-up stall speed.

Most elevators are run by two cables, an "up" and a "down," and a break in only one usually produces a partial loss of pitch control, not a total one (AFH 18-11).

• Loss of up-elevator control (down cable intact): the yoke moves aft easily with no response, but forward movement past neutral produces nose-down. Retain control by applying considerable nose-up trim, pushing the yoke forward to set the attitude, increasing forward pressure to lower the nose and relaxing it to raise the nose, and releasing forward pressure to flare (AFH 18-11).
• Loss of down-elevator control: mirror image — considerable nose-down trim, pull aft to set attitude, release back pressure to lower the nose, increase it to raise the nose, and increase back pressure to flare (AFH 18-11).

Trim itself is a backup control surface: if the linkage between the cabin and the elevator fails, leaving the elevator free to weathervane, the trim tab can raise or lower the elevator within limits — less effective than normal linkage at low airspeed, but usually enough to bring about a safe landing (AFH 18-11).

If the elevator is fully jammed, various combinations of power and flap extension offer a limited amount of pitch control, though a successful landing can be problematic (AFH 18-11).

This element is deliberately open-ended, so answer it with your airplane. The two the ACS names:

Supplemental oxygen. Know the altitudes cold (PHAK 7-37):

• 12,500–14,000 feet cabin pressure altitude: required after 30 minutes
• Above 14,000 feet: required immediately
• Above 15,000 feet: required for every occupant
• Above 10,000 feet by day and 5,000 feet at night: recommended for optimum protection

Aircraft oxygen is stored at 1,800–2,200 psi, and a drop in indicated cylinder pressure may simply be temperature, since pressure varies directly with temperature at constant volume (PHAK 7-37). The failure-mode teaching is mostly preflight: before each flight, thoroughly inspect and test all oxygen equipment — supply quantity, operational check, mask and tubing for tears or cracks, regulator valve and lever condition, gauges, flow indicators, connections — don the mask and test the system, and after any oxygen use verify all components and valves are shut off (PHAK 7-37). Name the fire hazard out loud: materials nearly fireproof in ordinary air may combust in oxygen; oils and greases may ignite; smoking during any oxygen use is prohibited (PHAK 7-37). In flight, a loss of supply is an emergency descent problem — Task XII.A.

Deice and anti-ice. The distinction first: anti-icing prevents ice from forming on protected surfaces; deicing removes ice that has already formed (AFH 13-9). Anti-ice equipment includes:

• Heated pitot tubes
• Non-icing static ports and fuel vents
• Prop boots or alcohol slingers
• Heated or alcohol-sprayed windshields
• Heated stall warning detectors

In the absence of AFM/POH guidance to the contrary, anti-icing equipment should be actuated prior to flight into known or suspected icing (AFH 13-9). Deice is generally pneumatic boots cycled as the AFM/POH directs (AFH 13-9). Three malfunction-level points a CFI must make:

• The presence of anti-icing and deicing equipment, even elaborate and complete, does not necessarily mean the airplane is approved for flight in icing conditions — consult the AFM/POH, placards, and the manufacturer (AFH 13-9).
• The equipment only clears the protected surfaces. Significant ice may form on unprotected areas even with proper use, and high AOA or normal climb speeds expose more of the underside (AFH 13-10).
• Impact ice over the induction source calls for carburetor heat or alternate air; the cue is rpm loss with a fixed-pitch propeller, manifold-pressure loss with a constant-speed propeller (AFH 13-9).

Instructor framing: for K4 the evaluator is testing whether you know your airplane's systems well enough to build a malfunction lesson around one. Pick the two or three systems your trainer actually has and be able to teach each one's failure signature, immediate action, and preflight check.

Because the door is not the emergency; the pilot is. In most instances the occurrence of an inadvertent door opening is not of great concern to the safety of flight, but rather the pilot's reaction at the moment it happens (AFH 18-17). It may bring a sudden loud noise, sustained noise, vibration, or buffeting, and a pilot who fixates on it can lose control even though the disruption of airflow by the door is minimal.

What you teach (AFH 18-17):

• Fly the airplane. A cabin door that opens in flight seldom compromises the airplane's ability to fly; roll or yaw effects are usually easily overcome.
• If it opens after liftoff, do not rush to land. Climb to normal pattern altitude, fly a normal pattern, make a normal landing.
• Do not release the belt and harness to reach the door. Leave it alone; close it on the ground.
• Most doors bang open then settle partly closed. A slip toward the door may open it wider; a slip away may push it closed.
• Do not panic, do not rush — hurrying produces steep turns at low altitude.
• Complete all items on the landing checklist.

The closing line is the lesson: accidents are almost never caused by an open door; an open door accident is caused by the pilot's distraction or failure to maintain control (AFH 18-17).

Treat it as a trainable, physiological event rather than a character flaw. When a learner meets a sudden threat, the fight-or-flight response engages — adrenaline, rapid heart rate, raised blood pressure — and there may be limited time to analyze the problem (AIH 2-9). The remedy the AIH prescribes for a frightening maneuver is the same one that works here: give the learner the opportunity to experience and develop a comfort level that mitigates the anxiety, by taking the procedure apart, demonstrating each stage, and letting them practice the stages in realistic scenarios until confidence is built (AIH 2-9).

Applied to malfunctions:

• Teach every system's failure mode on the ground first, with the airplane used as a procedures trainer.
• Introduce the in-flight version briefed, then later unbriefed but at altitude and in benign conditions.
• Debrief the reaction, not just the procedure. "You went quiet for four seconds" is a more useful observation than "you missed step two."

The ACS anticipates that reading a checklist can be impractical or unsafe. In those cases the evaluator assesses performance of the published or recommended immediate action "memory" items, along with a review of the appropriate checklist once conditions permit (ACS Appendix 2, Use of Checklists). In a single-pilot aircraft, the applicant demonstrates SRM, and if using the checklist while accomplishing an element would be unsafe or impractical, the applicant reviews the checklist afterward.

Teach the split explicitly: a short set of memory items that keeps the airplane flying and stops the situation getting worse, then the printed checklist as verification. Certain immediate action items — such as the response to an engine failure in a critical phase of flight — are best committed to memory; after they are accomplished, and as workload permits, the pilot compares the action taken with the checklist (AFH 13-35).

And the discipline that makes it real: pilots who do not use a checklist effectively will be at a significant disadvantage, and where a checklist and the AFM/POH disagree, the AFM/POH always takes precedence (AFH 13-35).

Two rules the AFH gives explicitly for multiengine training generalize to everything you will ever simulate:

• Surprising a learner with an emergency without a thorough briefing beforehand creates a hazardous condition (AFH 13-35). Brief the category, then vary the specific.
• Pulling circuit breakers is not recommended for training purposes and can lead to a subsequent gear-up landing (AFH 13-35). Anything you disable, you own — and anything you forget to restore, you fly home with. Upon completion of a training session, care should be taken to restore items to their proper positions (AFH 13-35).

The best answer for most of the K2 list is the ground: many normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures can be introduced and practiced in the airplane as it sits on the ground without the engines running — the airplane as a procedures trainer. The engines do not have to be operating for real learning to occur (AFH 13-35).

Use the FAA's positive three-step exchange, every time, briefed before the flight (ACS Appendix 2):

• "You have the flight controls."
• "I have the flight controls."
• "You have the flight controls" — with a visual confirmation of the exchange.

Doubt as to who is flying the aircraft should not occur. For this Task specifically, add a second layer: say what is simulated and what is real. "The alternator is simulated failed; the master stays on." Ambiguity about which systems are genuinely configured is how a simulated emergency becomes an actual one.

• Fixating on the malfunction instead of the airplane. The AFH's warning about engine problems at altitude applies to everything: airplanes have been lost due to apparent fixation on the problem to the detriment of flying the airplane (AFH 13-34). Correction: force a verbal loop — "altitude, heading, airspeed" — before any troubleshooting step.
• Skipping the memory items and reaching for the book. Correction: drill the immediate action items on the ground until they are reflex.
• Running the checklist and losing the airplane. Correction: teach delegation of attention, not speed.
• Diagnosing the wrong system. Correction: teach the confirming test for each — the alternate static source for pitot-static, the ammeter and bus voltage for electrical, the "no change when the throttle is retarded" test in a twin.
• Failure to land as soon as practicable. Several of these malfunctions have a running clock (battery, weather, smoke). Correction: make "when does this get worse?" part of every debrief.
• Undesired aircraft state going unrecognized (AI.XII.C.R4). Correction: a stated altitude or airspeed floor at which the exercise ends and normal flight resumes.

Unless the AFM/POH directs otherwise, the sequence is (AFH 18-9):

1. Shut off the fuel supply to the engine — mixture to idle cutoff, fuel selector/shutoff to OFF.
2. Leave the ignition switch ON to burn off the fuel remaining between the shutoff valve and the engine — this may starve the fire and cause it to die naturally.
3. If the flames are snuffed out, make no attempt to restart.

The reasoning: an in-flight engine compartment fire is usually caused by a failure that allows fuel, oil, or hydraulic fluid to contact a hot surface, and by the time a pilot becomes aware of it, it usually is well developed (AFH 18-9). It may show as smoke or flames from the cowling, or only as discoloration, bubbling, or melting of the cowling skin.

Two refinements worth teaching:

• Thick black smoke indicates an oil-fed fire; bright orange flames indicate fuel-fed. For an oil-fed fire, consider stopping propeller rotation — feather it, or on a constant-speed installation move the pitch control to minimum rpm and raise the nose to reduce airspeed until it stops — to stop the engine-driven pump from feeding the fire (AFH 18-9).
• Some checklists direct shutting off the electrical master. Consider that unless the fire is electrical or a crash landing is imminent, deactivating the electrical system prevents radio distress calls and causes ATC to lose transponder returns (AFH 18-9).

Finally: a fire that appears extinguished has been known to rekindle with changes in airflow pattern and airspeed, and a brief but intense fire could cause dangerous structural damage that may be burning out of view (AFH 18-9).

The first indication is usually the distinct odor of burning insulation. Attempt to identify the faulty circuit by checking circuit breakers, instruments, avionics, and lights. If it cannot be readily detected and isolated, and flight conditions permit, turn off the battery master and alternator/generator switches — though materials already ignited may continue to burn (AFH 18-9).

If electrical power is genuinely essential, the AFH's isolation procedure is (AFH 18-10):

1. Master switch OFF.
2. All individual electrical switches OFF.
3. Master switch back ON.
4. Turn on the switches that were on before the fire indication one at a time, pausing after each to check for odor, smoke, or sparks.

Teach the honest caveat with it: this procedure has the effect of recreating the original problem, and the most prudent course of action is to land as soon as possible (AFH 18-10).

Control it first by identifying and shutting down the faulty system, then vent in this order (AFH 18-10):

1. Use the fire extinguisher first, if available. Only then open the cabin air control to purge smoke and fumes.
2. If smoke increases in intensity when the vents are opened, close them immediately. That indicates a possible fire in the heating system or nose baggage compartment, or that the added airflow is feeding the fire.
3. In unpressurized singles and light twins, the foul weather windows can be opened to expel smoke — closed immediately if the fire intensifies.
4. With severe smoke, oxygen masks if available, and initiate an immediate descent.
5. Know your airplane: on some airplanes, lowering the landing gear and/or wing flaps can aggravate a cabin smoke problem.

Cabin fires generally come from three sources: careless smoking, electrical system malfunctions, or heating system malfunctions. The pilot faces two simultaneous demands — attacking the fire and getting the airplane on the ground quickly (AFH 18-10).

Once conventional and alternate extension methods have failed, a gear-up landing is considered inevitable — stop troubleshooting and start planning (AFH 18-12):

• Select an airport with crash and rescue facilities if possible, and do not hesitate to request that emergency equipment stand by.
• A smooth hard-surface runway usually causes less damage than a rough unimproved grass strip — but a hard surface creates sparks that can ignite fuel. Foaming can be requested if the airport is equipped. Consider burning off excess fuel to reduce landing speed and fire potential.
• If one main gear leg is the problem, burn fuel from that side to lighten that wing so it can be held airborne longer during the rollout.
• If only one gear leg will not extend, the choice is landing on the available legs or all gear retracted. Landing on one main causes the airplane to veer strongly toward the faulty side after touchdown; on a narrow runway with ditches or obstacles at the edges, all three retracted may be the safest course.
• One main retracted: land nose-high, wings level, use whatever aileron is needed to hold the unsupported wing up as long as possible, then expect a strong yaw and be ready for full opposite rudder and aggressive braking.
• Nosewheel retracted: hold the nose off until almost full up-elevator is applied, then release back pressure so the nose settles slowly. Holding full up-elevator results in the nose dropping abruptly as airspeed decays, possibly burrowing. Do not brake during the rollout unless necessary to avoid obstacles.
• Only the nose gear extended: initial contact on the aft fuselage in a nose-high attitude, then let the nosewheel touch gradually, using nosewheel steering for directional control.

Because a complete failure decides for the pilot and a partial one does not. Not all engine failures are catastrophic. Many cases of power loss are fuel starvation, where power may be restored by selecting another tank; an orderly inventory of gauges and switches may reveal the problem. Other remediations worth trying (AFH 13-34):

• Carburetor heat or alternate air
• Running on one magneto or at a lower power setting
• Altering the mixture
• Boost pump operation, which may eliminate flow and pressure fluctuations from fuel vapor

Against that, catastrophic failure accompanied by heavy vibration, smoke, blistering paint, or large trails of oil indicates a critical situation (AFH 13-34).

The teachable judgment: the engine should be left running if there is any doubt as to needing it for further safe flight (AFH 13-34) — while in a single, exploiting the power available from an irregularly running engine is worthwhile, though it is generally better to switch the engine and fuel off just before touchdown, which preserves the pilot's initiative and reduces the fire hazard from a cooled-down engine (AFH 18-4).

Scenario to give the student: rough-running engine, 40 miles from anywhere, VFR. That is a precautionary landing decision — a premeditated landing when further flight is possible but inadvisable — and the AFH warns that too many situations calling for a precautionary landing are allowed to develop into forced landings when the pilot uses wishful thinking instead of reason (AFH 18-1).